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Abstract
This paper shows a core-equilibrium convergence in a public goods
economy where consumers’ preferences display warm glow effects. We
demonstrate that if each consumer becomes satiated to other con-
sumers’ provision, then as the economy grows large the core shrinks
to the set of Edgeworth allocations. Moreover, we show that an Edge-
worth allocation can be decentralized as a warm glow equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
The seminal contribution of Debreu and Scarf (1963) shows that, as the set
of consumers is replicated in a pure exchange economy, the set of core allo-
cations shrinks to the Walrasian equilibrium allocations. The core consists
of feasible allocations such that no coalition can achieve a preferred outcome
for its members by seceding from the grand coalition and proposing another
allocation. The Debreu and Scarf contribution, a rigorous formulation of an
earlier conjecture by Edgeworth (1881), has gained prominence as a justifi-
cation for the emergence of competitive behavior as a consequence of social
stability.
In economies with public goods, various attempts have been made to
establish a similar core-equilibrium convergence result for the Lindahl price-
based mechanism. This is of paramount importance, as it would provide
the Lindahl equilibrium with the same solid foundation of competitive equi-
librium. Unfortunately, it turns out that this type of convergence is the
exception rather than the rule. The literature is furnished with either ro-
bust examples of non-convergence (for example, see Muench (1972), Milleron
(1972), Champsaur, Roberts, and Rosenthal (1975), and Buchholz and Pe-
ters (2007)) or a few context-specific convergences. The intuitive reason for
this is that, unlike the case of a pure exchange economy, potential blocking
coalitions are more likely to fall short of the resources available to the grand
coalition to produce public goods. Hence, unless the benefit of ever-increasing
public goods provision is limited when the economy grows large, the core-
equilibrium convergence is likely to fail. The work of Wooders (1983) and
Conley (1994) provides valuable insights into economies with public goods
where the above limitation holds. The game theoretic approach of Wood-
ers (1983) imposes the assumption of per-capita boundedness on the equal
treatment payoffs of replica games to ensure the nonemptiness of an approxi-
mate limit core. Conley (1994) evokes the possibility of asymptotic satiation
in public goods consumption due to the resulting large magnitude of the
aggregate supply of public goods in replica economies.
More recently, Vasil
′
ev, Weber, and Wiesmeth (1995) and Florenzano and
del Mercato (2006) show a subtle convergence of modified core allocations
to Lindahl equilibria. Given that the set of core allocations is usually bigger
than the set of Lindahl allocations, Vasil
′
ev, Weber, and Wiesmeth (1995)
and Florenzano and del Mercato (2006) bypass this difficulty by constructing
a sequence of artificial replica economies where the public goods provision of
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each coalition is normalized by its size. More generally, as in the clubs/local
public goods literature, where the public goods are subject to crowding and
congestion, the social stability underlying the formation of communities and
groups providing these goods will eventually settle the economy in a com-
petitive equilibrium (for example, see Wooders (1989, 1997), Allouch and
Wooders (2008), and Allouch, Conley, and Wooders (2009)).
The existence of the Lindahl equilibrium in economies with public goods
was first formalized by Foley (1967, 1970) (see also Fabre-Sender (1969),
Milleron (1972), Roberts (1974), and Bergstrom (1976)). Foley’s approach
consists of embedding the public goods economy into a larger private goods
economy wherein each consumer is the only buyer of his own copy of each
public goods bundle. The existence of the Lindahl equilibrium is then estab-
lished by resorting to standard existence results for private goods economies.
In the public goods literature, lately, the warm glow model, where consumers
receive a direct benefit from their own public goods provision, has been put
forward by Andreoni (1989, 1990) (see also Becker (1974) and Cornes and
Sandler (1984)) as an alternative description of public goods provision. In
a recent paper, Allouch (2009) introduces a Lindahl-like competitive equi-
librium for a warm glow economy and provides the three fundamental the-
orems of general equilibrium (existence of equilibrium and the two welfare
theorems). It is worth noting that the warm glow equilibrium coincides with
the Lindahl equilibrium if we consider a standard formalization of utility
functions. A natural question then arises: “Under what circumstances do the
core allocations converge to the warm glow equilibrium?”
Fortunately, one possible answer to the above question comes from the
literature on warm glow itself:
“Another way to see this intuitively is that, as the size of the
charity grows, all giving due to altruism will be crowded out,
leaving only giving due to warm-glow. This accords naturally
with the observation that giving 100 dollars to an organization
that collects millions is motivated more by an admiration for the
organization than for any measurable effect of the marginal do-
nation.”(p. 1223, Andreoni, 2006)
and
“For example, as the size of the population increases, choosing
a contribution level becomes more and more like picking the level
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of consumption for any conventional good. In the limit, the con-
tributor simply weighs the relative merits of spending money on
two different private goods, xi and gi; the effect on his well-being
through G becomes negligible.”(p. 62, Bernheim and Rangel,
2007)
In this paper, we formalize the above observations as an assumption and
establish that core allocations converge to the warm glow equilibrium. Specif-
ically, the assumption driving our warm glow core-equilibrium convergence
result stipulates that, beyond a threshold of other consumers’ public goods
provision, each consumer benefits only from his own public goods provision
and private goods consumption. Thus, eventually an increase in public goods
provision by other consumers has no effect on the consumer’s welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model of
a warm glow economy. In Section 3 we define core and Edgeworth allocations,
introduce our main economic assumption, and show the nonemptiness of the
set of Edgeworth allocations. In Section 4 we introduce the concept of warm
glow equilibrium and state our core-equilibrium convergence result. Section
5 is an Appendix containing a proof.
2 The model
We consider a public goods economy E with i = 1, . . . , N consumers, l =
1, . . . , L private goods, and k = 1, . . . , K public goods. A consumption bun-
dle of private goods is denoted by x = (x1, . . . , xL) ∈ RL+ and a consumption
bundle of public goods is denoted by g = (g1, . . . , gK) ∈ RK+ . The private and
public goods consumption set is RL+K+ , for each consumer i. The produc-
tion technology for public goods is described by an aggregate production set
Y ⊂ RL+K . A typical production plan will be written (y, g), where y ∈ RL
denotes inputs of private goods and g ∈ RK denotes outputs of public goods.
Each consumer i has an endowment of private goods, denoted by wi ∈ RL++,
and has no endowment of public goods. The preferences of each consumer i
may be represented by a utility function ui(xi, gi, G−i), where xi is consumer
i’s private goods consumption, gi is consumer i’s public goods provision, and
G−i =
∑
j 6=i gj is the total provision of public goods minus consumer i’s
provision. The utility function ui satisfies the following properties:
[A.1] Monotonicity: The utility function ui(·, ·, ·) is increasing. More-
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over, given any G−i ∈ RK+ , the function ui(·, ·, G−i) is strictly increasing on
RL+ × RK++.
[A.2] Continuity: The utility function ui(·, ·, ·) is continuous.
[A.3] Convexity: The utility function ui(·, ·, ·) is quasi-concave.
[A.4] Warm glow indispensability: For every (xi, gi, G−i) ∈ RL+K+ , if
gi /∈ RK++ then ui(xi, gi, G−i) = infui(·, ·, ·).
For simplicity, we consider a constant returns to scale technology. Thus
we assume that Y is a closed convex cone with vertex the origin, satisfying
the usual conditions of irreversibility, no free production, and free disposal.
In addition, we assume the possibility of producing public goods, that is,
Y ∩ (RL × RK++) 6= ∅.
3 Core and Edgeworth allocations
Let S be a nonempty subset of N . An allocation ((xi, gi), i ∈ S) ∈ R(L+K)|S|+
is S-feasible if
(
∑
i∈S
(xi − wi),
∑
i∈S
gi) ∈ Y.
For simplicity of notations, an N -feasible allocation will simply be called a
feasible allocation.
A coalition S ⊂ N can improve upon an allocation ((xi, gi), i ∈ N) if
there exists an S-feasible allocation ((xi, gi), i ∈ S), such that
ui(xi, gi,
∑
j∈S\{i}
gj) > ui(xi, gi, G−i), for each consumer i ∈ S.
That is to say, coalition S could do better for its members by breaking away
from the grand coalition and proposing another allocation that is achievable
with its own resources. An allocation ((xi, gi), i ∈ N) is in the core if it is
feasible and cannot be improved upon by any coalition S ⊂ N .
For each positive integer r, we define the rth replica economy, denoted by
Er, as the economy with a set of consumers
Nr = {(i, q) | i = 1, . . . , N and q = 1, . . . , r}.
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Consumer (i, q) is called the qth consumer of type i. It will be the case
that all consumers of type i are identical in terms of their consumption sets,
endowments, and preferences to consumer i. Let S be a nonempty subset of
Nr. An allocation ((x(i,q), g(i,q)), (i, q) ∈ S) is S-feasible in the economy Er if
(
∑
(i,q)∈S
(x(i,q) − w(i,q)),
∑
(i,q)∈S
g(i,q)) ∈ Y.
For each positive integer r, we define the rth replica of allocation ((xi, gi), i ∈ N),
denoted by ((x(i,q), g(i,q)), (i, q) ∈ Nr), as follows:
x(i,q) = xi and g(i,q) = gi, for each (i, q) ∈ Nr.
That is, in the rth replica economy Er, each of the rth replica consumers of
type i has the same private goods and public goods consumption as consumer
i. An allocation ((xi, gi), i ∈ N) is called an equal treatment core allocation
of the rth replica economy Er if the rth replica of allocation ((xi, gi), i ∈ N)
is in the core of Er. The set of all equal treatment core allocations of Er is
called the equal treatment core and is denoted by Cr.
Finally, an allocation ((xi, gi), i ∈ N) is an Edgeworth allocation if for
each positive integer r, ((xi, gi), i ∈ N) is in the equal treatment core of the
rth replica economy Er, that is,
((xi, gi), i ∈ N) ∈
∞⋂
r=1
Cr.
3.1 Nonemptiness of the set of Edgeworth allocations
Andreoni (2006) and Bernheim and Rangel (2007) argue that asymptotically
consumers’ charitable giving is due more to the act of giving itself than to
concerns about the aggregate provision of public goods. Our main assump-
tion formalizes this idea.
[WGD] Warm glow dominance1 For every consumer i ∈ N , there
exists a bundle of public goods G∗−i ∈ RK++, such that for all (xi, gi, G−i) ∈
RL+2K+ with G−i ≥ G∗−i, it holds that
ui(xi, gi, G
∗
−i) = ui(xi, gi, G−i).
1We borrowed this term from Andreoni (2006).
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The [WGD] assumption ensures that beyond a public goods bundle of other
consumers’ provision, each consumer benefits only from his public goods
provision and his private goods consumption. It is worth noting that the
[WGD] assumption does not imply the asymptotic satiation assumption in
public goods of Conley (1994) since consumers may not be asymptotically
satiated in their own public goods provisions.
In public goods economies, it is well known that the core does not shrink
and may well expand, unless the returns to coalition size are limited. Our
theorem below shows that, under the warm glow dominance assumption,
eventually the core shrinks and the set of Edgeworth allocations is nonempty.
Theorem 1. Assume [A.1]-[A.4] and [WGD]. Then there exists a positive
integer r∗ such that for each r ≥ r∗, it holds that
Cr+1 ⊂ Cr and
∞⋂
r=r∗
Cr 6= ∅.
Proof of Theorem 1. We first construct an auxiliary private goods pro-
duction economy Eˆ with N consumers. Each consumer i is described by a
consumption set RL+K+ , an endowment (wi, 0) ∈ RL+K+ , and a utility function
uˆi defined as follows:
uˆi(xi, gi) = ui(xi, gi, G
∗
−i), for all (xi, gi) ∈ RL+K+ .
The production technology of the auxiliary economy Eˆ is characterized by
the production set Y. Hence, it is obvious that the set of feasible allocations
of the auxiliary economy Eˆ coincides with the set of feasible allocations of
the economy E . For each positive integer r, let us consider Cˆr, the set of
equal treatment allocations in the core of the rth replica of the economy
Eˆ . From standard results on the nonemptiness of the core and the set of
Edgeworth allocations for private goods production economies (for example,
see Aliprantis, Brown, and Burkinshaw (1990) and Florenzano (1990, 2003)),
it holds that for each positive integer r,
Cˆr+1 ⊂ Cˆr and
∞⋂
r=1
Cˆr 6= ∅.
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We claim that there exists a positive integer r∗, such that for each r ≥ r∗,
it holds that
Cr = Cˆr. (1)
We start with the following observation: from the definition of the auxiliary
utility function uˆi, it is easy to see that for any allocation ((xi, gi), i ∈ N),
whenever (r − 1)gi ≥ G∗−i, it holds that
((xi, gi), i ∈ N) ∈ Cr if and only if ((xi, gi), i ∈ N) ∈ Cˆr.
Suppose (1) were not true. Then, without loss of generality, one could
show that for each positive integer r, there exists nr ≥ r and an allocation
((xnri , g
nr
i ), i ∈ N) ∈ Cˆnr , such that for some i0 ∈ N , it holds that
(nr − 1)gnri0 6≥ G∗−i0 . (2)
By compactness of the feasible set for the auxiliary economy Eˆ and without
loss of generality, one could assume that (xnri0 , g
nr
i0
) converges to (x∗i0 , g
∗
i0
). It
then follows from (2) that g∗i0 /∈ RK++. Then, by the warm glow indispensabil-
ity assumption and the possibility of producing public goods, it follows that
for sufficiently large nr, the allocation ((x
nr
i , g
nr
i ), i ∈ N) could be blocked by
any consumer of type i0 in the n
th
r replica of the economy Eˆ . This contradicts
the fact that ((xnri , g
nr
i ), i ∈ N) ∈ Cˆnr .¤
4 Warm glow equilibrium
In a recent paper, Allouch (2009) introduces the warm glow equilibrium con-
cept as a competitive equilibrium for a warm glow economy. Similar to the
Lindahl equilibrium, the warm glow equilibrium2 provides a decentralized
price mechanism achieving efficient outcomes. In a warm glow equilibrium,
each consumer faces a common price for his private goods consumption, a
personalized price for his own public goods provision, and another personal-
ized price for other consumers’ public goods provision. These personalized
2It is worth noting that the warm glow equilibrium coincides with the Lindahl equilib-
rium if we consider the standard public goods model, where preferences of consumer i are
represented by the utility function ui(xi, gi +G−i) instead of ui(xi, gi, G−i).
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prices arise from the externalities brought about by each consumer’s public
goods provision.
Definition: A warm glow equilibrium is ((xi, gi, pii, pi−i)i∈N , p, p
g), where
((xi, gi), i ∈ N) is a feasible allocation, p ∈ RL+ is a price system for private
goods, pg ∈ RK+ is a price system for public goods, pii ∈ RK+ is the personalized
price of consumer i’s own public goods provision, and pi−i ∈ RK+ is consumer
i’s personalized price for other consumers’ public goods provision, such that
(i). for all (y, g) ∈ Y,
(p, pg) · (y, g) ≤ (p, pg) · (
∑
i∈N
(xi − wi),
∑
i∈N
gi) = 0;
(ii). for each consumer i ∈ N,
p · xi + pii · gi + pi−i ·G−i = p · wi,
and if
ui(xi, gi, G−i) > ui(xi, gi, G−i)
then
p · xi + pii · gi + pi−i ·G−i > p · wi;
(iii). for each consumer i ∈ N ,
pii +
∑
j 6=i
pi−j = pg.
Condition (i) is the profit maximization, Condition (ii) is the utility max-
imization, and Condition (iii) ensures that the personalized prices for each
consumer’s public goods provision sum to the public goods price.
We now show that the warm glow equilibrium belongs to the core of the
economy. It is worth noting that, similar to other competitive equilibrium
concepts, our proof could be easily extended to show that the warm glow
equilibrium belongs to the core of each replica economy.
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Theorem 2. If ((xi, gi, pii, pi−i)i∈N , p, p
g) is a warm glow equilibrium, then
((xi, gi), i ∈ N) is in the core.
Proof of Theorem 2. First, it follows from the definition of warm glow
equilibrium that ((xi, gi), i ∈ N) is feasible. Now suppose that there is a
coalition S ⊂ N and an S-feasible allocation ((xi, gi), i ∈ S) such that
ui(xi, gi,
∑
j∈S\{i}
gj) > ui(xi, gi, G−i), for each i ∈ S.
From (ii) in the definition of warm glow equilibrium, for each consumer i it
holds that
p · xi + pii · gi + pi−i ·
∑
j∈S\{i}
gj > p · wi.
Summing the above inequalities over i ∈ S, it holds that∑
i∈S
p · xi +
∑
i∈S
(pii +
∑
j∈S\{i}
pi−j) · gi >
∑
i∈S
p · wi. (3)
We may now extend the allocation ((xi, gi), i ∈ S) in the following way. For
each i /∈ S, we set (xi, gi) = (wi, 0). Since ((xi, gi), i ∈ S) is an S-feasible
allocation, it follows that ((xi, gi), i ∈ N) is a feasible allocation.
Then, (3) implies that∑
i∈N
p · xi +
∑
i∈N
(pii +
∑
j∈N\{i}
pi−j) · gi >
∑
i∈N
p · wi.
Since pg = pii +
∑
j∈N\{i} pi−i, it follows that
p ·
∑
i∈N
(xi − wi) + pg ·
∑
i∈N
gi > 0,
which contradicts (i) in the definition of warm glow equilibrium.¤
We now show that an Edgeworth allocation can be decentralized as a
warm glow equilibrium.
Theorem 3. Assume [A.1]-[A.4]. Let ((xi, gi), i ∈ N) be an Edgeworth
allocation of the economy satisfying gi ∈ RK++, for every i ∈ N. Then there
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is a price system ((pii, pi−i)i∈N , p, pg) 6= 0 such that ((xi, gi, pii, pi−i)i∈N , p, pg)
is a warm glow equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 3. See the Appendix.¤
The following theorem concludes our results.
Theorem 4. Assume [A.1]-[A.4] and [WGD]. Then there exists a positive
integer r∗, such that the r∗ replica economy Er∗ has a warm glow equilibrium.
Moreover, the set of warm glow equilibria of the economy Er∗ is equivalent
to the set of Edgeworth allocations.
Proof of Theorem 4. This is immediate from Theorem 1, Theorem 2, and
Theorem 3. Indeed, Theorem 1 states that eventually the core shrinks and
the set of Edgeworth allocations is nonempty. Theorem 2 states that a warm
glow equilibrium is in the core and Theorem 3 shows that an Edgeworth
allocation can be decentralized as a warm glow equilibrium.¤
5 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 3. In public goods economies, the fundamental step is
to construct an auxiliary economy in which the public goods consumption
set is expanded so that each consumer is the only buyer of his own copy
of the public goods bundle (see, for example, Foley (1967, 1970), Fabre-
Sender (1969), Milleron (1972), Roberts (1974), and Bergstrom (1976)). In
the following, we construct an auxiliary economy in a similar way. However,
we consider an individual preferred set for each consumer rather than an
aggregate preferred set for the economy.
Let ((xi, gi), i ∈ N) be an Edgeworth allocation of the economy satisfying
gi ∈ RK++, for every i ∈ N. First, for each consumer i, we define the set
Γi ⊂ RL+2NK , where N is the number of consumers, L is the number of
private goods, and K is the number of public goods, as follows:
Γi = {(xi − wi, 0, 0, . . . , gi, G−i, . . . , 0, 0) | ui(xi, gi, G−i) > ui(xi, gi, G−i)}.
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The set Γi is consumer i’s expanded preferred set, listing his net trade in
private goods (xi − wi) and each consumer j(∈ N)’s public goods provision
and complementary public goods provision (gj, G−j) such that (gj, G−j) =
(0, 0) for all j 6= i and (xi, gi, G−i) is strictly preferred to (xi, gi, G−i) by
consumer i.
Since [A.1], the set Γi is nonempty for each consumer i. In addition, it is
easy to check that the convexity of the preferences implies that Γi is convex
for each consumer i. Let Γ denote the convex hull of the union of the sets
Γi, i = 1, . . . , N . It is worth noting that the convex hull of the union of a
finite number of convex sets may be written as the convex combination of
these sets.
Now we define the set
Y˜ = {(y, g1, G−1, . . . , gN , G−N) | for each i, G−i =
∑
j 6=i
gj and (y,
∑
j∈N
gj) ∈ Y }.
The set Y˜ is a convex cone with vertex the origin since Y is a convex cone
with vertex the origin. We claim that
Γ ∩ Y˜ = ∅.
To see this, assume on the contrary that Γ ∩ Y˜ 6= ∅. Then there exists
(xi−wi, 0, 0, . . . , gi, G−i, . . . , 0, 0) ∈ Γi and (λi)i∈N ∈ RN+ such that
∑
i∈N λi =
1, and ∑
i∈N
λi(xi − wi, 0, 0, . . . , gi, G−i, . . . , 0, 0) ∈ Y˜ .
Let S = {i ∈ N | λi > 0}. It is obvious that S 6= ∅ since
∑
i∈N λi = 1.
For each i ∈ S and each positive integer n, let ni be the smallest integer
that is greater than or equal to nλi. For each i ∈ S, define
(xni , g
n
i , G
n
−i) =
nλi
ni
(xi, gi, G−i) + (1− nλi
ni
)(wi, 0, 0). (4)
From continuity of preferences, for all n sufficiently large, it holds that
ui(x
n
i , g
n
i , G
n
−i) > ui(xi, gi, G−i), for each i ∈ S.
It follows from (4) that∑
i∈S
(
ni
n
)
nλi
ni
(xi − wi, 0, 0, . . . , gi, G−i, . . . , 0, 0) ∈ Y˜
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and ∑
i∈S
ni
n
(xni − wi, 0, 0, . . . , gni , Gn−i, . . . , 0, 0) ∈ Y˜ .
Since Y˜ is a cone with vertex zero, it holds that∑
i∈S
ni(x
n
i − wi, 0, 0, . . . , gni , Gn−i, . . . , 0, 0) ∈ Y˜ .
Thus we have constructed a blocking coalition, which is a contradiction to
the assumption that ((xi, gi), i ∈ N) is an Edgeworth allocation. Therefore
Γ ∩ Y˜ = ∅.
From the Minkowski’s separating hyperplane theorem, there exists a hy-
perplane with normal (p, pi1, pi−1, . . . , piN , pi−N) 6= 0, and a scalar r such that
(i). for all (y, g1, G−1, . . . , gN , G−N) ∈ Γ,
(p, pi1, pi−1, . . . , piN , pi−N) · (y, g1, G−1, . . . , gN , G−N) ≥ r;
(ii). for all (y, g1, G−1, . . . , gN , G−N) ∈ Y˜ ,
(p, pi1, pi−1, . . . , piN , pi−N) · (y, g1, G−1, . . . , gN , G−N) ≤ r.
Since Y˜ is a closed convex cone with vertex zero, we can choose r = 0. It
follows from (i) in the separation theorem that for any consumer i, and any
consumption bundle (xi, gi, G−i) such that ui(xi, gi, G−i) > ui(xi, gi, G−i), it
holds that
p · (xi − wi) + pii · gi + pi−i ·G−i ≥ 0. (5)
Thus, by continuity and monotonicity of preferences, we obtain
p · (xi − wi) + pii · gi + pi−i ·G−i ≥ 0.
Summing the above inequalities over i ∈ N and rearranging terms, we get
(p, pi1, pi−1, . . . , piN , pi−N) · (
∑
i∈N
(xi − wi), g1, G−1, . . . , gN , G−N) ≥ 0. (6)
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By feasibility of ((xi, gi), i ∈ N) and (ii) in the separation theorem, it holds
that
(p, pi1, pi−1, . . . , piN , pi−N) · (
∑
i∈N
(xi − wi), g1, G−1, . . . , gN , G−N) ≤ 0. (7)
Hence, it follows from (6) and (7) that
(p, pi1, pi−1, . . . , piN , pi−N) · (
∑
i∈N
(xi − wi), g1, G−1, . . . , gN , G−N) = 0. (8)
And, therefore
p · (xi − wi) + pii · gi + pi−i ·G−i = 0. (9)
We claim that for any two consumers j1 and j2, it holds that
pij1 +
∑
i6=j1
pi−i = pij2 +
∑
i6=j2
pi−i.
Suppose this were not the case, then, without loss of generality, one could
assume that for some public good, say the kth, it holds that
pikj1 +
∑
i6=j1
pik−i > pi
k
j2
+
∑
i6=j2
pik−i.
Let δk be a vector in RK+ consisting of one unit of the kth public good and
nothing else. For a small enough ε > 0, let us consider the public goods
bundle G
ε
= (gεi , . . . , g
ε
N), defined as follows:
G
ε
=

gεj1 = gj1 + εδk,
gεj2 = gj2 − εδk,
gεi = gi, if i ∈ N \ {j1, j2}.
It is obvious that
(
∑
i∈N
(xi − wi), gε1, Gε−1, . . . , gεN , Gε−N) ∈ Y˜ .
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Moreover, since (8), it follows that
(p, pi1, pi−1, . . . , piN , pi−N) · (
∑
i∈N
(xi − wi), gε1, Gε−1, . . . , gεN , Gε−N) > 0,
but this contradicts property (i) of the separation theorem. Thus, we set up
pg = pii +
∑
j 6=i
pi−j, for all i ∈ N.
In view of this, property (ii) of the separation theorem and (8) imply that
for all (y, g) ∈ Y,
(p, pg) · (y, g) ≤ (p, pg) · (
∑
i∈N
(xi − wi),
∑
i∈N
gi) = 0.
This proves (i) and (iii) in the definition of warm glow equilibrium.
From [A.1] and the separation theorem, it follows that p ∈ RL+ \ {0}
and for each consumer i, (pii, pi−i) ∈ (RK+ \ {0}) × RK+ . We now show that
for any consumer i, and any consumption bundle (xi, gi, G−i) such that
ui(xi, gi, G−i) > ui(xi, gi, G−i), it holds that
p · xi + pii · gi + pi−i ·G−i > p · wi.
Assume that this were not the case. By indispensability of warm glow pro-
vision, it follows that gi ∈ RK++. Then there exists g′i ∈ RK+ , such that
g′i << gi. Therefore, by quasi-concavity and continuity, along the line joining
(xi, g
′
i, G−i) and (xi, gi, G−i), there is a point in the consumption set of con-
sumer i that is strictly preferred to (xi, gi, G−i) and costs strictly less than
p ·wi. This contradicts (5). This and (9) prove (ii) in the definition of warm
glow equilibrium.¤
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